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Family lifestyles, including marriage, have changed dra-
matically during the past few years. One significant change in
lifestyles is the growing number of women and men cohabiting
outside of marriage. The 1980 Census indicates that the
number of unmarried, heterosexual couple households tripled
between 1970 and 1980.1 As a result of the increasing number
of cohabiting couples, the legal rights and obligations of cohabi-
tants2 are under legislative consideration. State legislatures
are now beginning to codify cohabitants' rights.
Four years ago, the Minnesota legislature enacted a stat-
ute that addressed cohabitants' rights to property acquired dur-
ing a cohabiting couple's relationship. The Minnesota
cohabitation statute bars unmarried cohabitants' claims for
property upon separation unless a written contract exists be-
tween the two parties. 3 This statute of frauds4 applies to indi-
* Ms. Knoblauch is a J.D. candidate at the University of Minnesota.
1. The number of unmarried, heterosexual couple households in 1980 had
reached 1,560,000. In 1970, the number of such households was 523,000. U.S. Bu-
reau of the Census, Dep't of Commerce, Current Population Reports, Series P-
20, No. 365, Marital Status and Living Arrangements 4 (1981).
2. This Argument uses the term "cohabitants" to describe two unrelated
adults who share a common household. Although "cohabitants" includes all
heterosexual and lesbian/gay couples, this Argument does not include the
unique dynamics of lesbian/gay cohabitation, since the Minnesota cohabitation
statute applies only to heterosexual couples. See infra note 3.
3. Minn. Stat. § 513.075 (1982) (originally enacted 1980) states:
If sexual relations between the parties are contemplated, a con-
tract between a man and a woman who are living together in this
state out of wedlock, or who are about to commence living together
in this state out of wedlock, is enforceable as to terms concerning
the property and financial relations of the parties only if:
(1) the contract is written and signed by the parties,
and
(2) enforcement is sought after termination of the relationship.
4. A "statute of frauds" is a legal term of art. It generally means that a legal
action cannot be maintained on a certain kind of contract, in this case a cohabi-
tation agreement, unless the contract is in writing and signed by the party
against whom enforcement is sought. See generally John Calamari and Joseph
Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 19-1, at 672-74 (2d ed. 1977).
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viduals living together in "contemplation of sexual relations
and out of wedlock."5 The statute denies Minnesota courts ju-
risdiction to hear any cohabitants' claims which are not based
on a written contract, because such claims are "contrary to
public policy."6 Oral or implied cohabitation agreements are
unenforceable, and equitable remedies 7 are unavailable, if the
agreement is based on the relationship of two individuals living
together in contemplation of sexual relations.
The Minnesota legislature enacted the cohabitation stat-
ute in response to the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in
Carlson v. Olson.8 Laura Carlson and Oral Olson lived together
unmarried for twenty-one years.9 Publicly, they presented
themselves as a married couple; together they raised a son to
majority, and acquired a home and personal property. After
the relationship ended, Laura Carlson brought an action to re-
cover what she considered to be her half of their property accu-
mulated during the twenty-one year relationship. Based on the
finding that the parties had intended to divide their accumu-
lated property equally, the trial court allowed the action and al-
lotted a fifty percent interest in the property to each. The trial
court also held that Laura Carlson's share of the property con-
stituted an irrevocable gift from Oral Olson in consideration for
the services she performed as a wife and mother during their
relationship. The court in Carlson approved the lower court's
use of equitable powers and remedies to enforce the reason-
able expectations of the couple.lO The state legislature, in en-
5. Minn. Stat. J 513.076 (1982) states:
Unless the individuals have executed a contract complying with
the provisions of section 513.075, the courts of this state are without
jurisdiction to hear and shall dismiss as contrary to public policy
any claim by an individual to the earnings or property of another
individual if the claim is based on the fact that the individuals
lived together in contemplation of sexual relations and out of wed-
lock within or without this state.
6. Id.
7. Equitable remedies are remedies derived from the court's notions of "jus-
tice" and "fairness." Equitable remedies extend beyond the remedies that the
applicable law may provide. See generally Dan Dobbs, Handbook on the Law
of Remedies §J 2.1-2.2, at 24-34 (1973).
8. 256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977).
9. Minnesota does not recognize common law marriage.
10. The Minnesota Supreme Court relied heavily on Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal.
3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 122 CaL
App. 3d 871, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1981). The California Supreme Court in Marvin
held that the courts could enforce contracts between cohabitants unless the
consideration for the contract was meretricious sexual services. The California
court added that, in the absence of an express contract, the courts may look to
a variety of other remedies in order to protect the parties' reasonable expecta-
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acting the cohabitation statute, reversed the rule of the Carlson
decision and limited the court's power to enforce cohabitation
agreements to written agreements."1
Minnesota's cohabitation statute contains two defects.
First, the cohabitation statute is based upon invalid assump-
tions. As a result, the statute does not reflect the actual behav-
ior and attitudes of cohabiting couples. Second, and more
important, the cohabitation statute deters changes which would
adjust or address the actual social inequities between female
and male cohabitants.
IL The Cohabitation Statute is Based Upon Invalid Legislative
Assumptions
Laws must reflect social reality to function effectively.
The cohabitation statute completely fails to reflect the social
situation of cohabitants. The legislature erroneously assumes
that all cohabitants are alike. "Cohabitation," however, does
not define a single kind of relationship. "Cohabitation" encom-
passes a continuum of relationships that range from relation-
ships closely resembling traditional marriages to relationships
free of financial and personal commitment. Actually, the ste-
reotypes of cohabitants as young and of cohabitation as non-
traditional are invalid. A significant percentage of cohabitants
are over thirty years old.12 Many more cohabiting relationships
adopt traditional marriage forms in contrast to independent re-
lationships. 13 Cohabitants and married persons behave simi-
larly with respect to their domestic division of labor, their
pattern of decision-making and their adoption of roles.
The cohabitation statute does not allow the courts to con-
sider any of these factors which together constitute the nature
tions. 122 Cal. 3d at 665, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819, 557 P.2d at 110. These reasonable
expectations are not expectations of marriage; rather, they are the expectations
of the personal relationship at issue. Of course, the court determines both
what is reasonable and what classifies as an expectation of the parties. This
Argument uses the term "reasonable expectations" merely as a legal term of
art.
The Marvin court suggested several possible remedies, such as implied
contracts, partnerships, constructive and resulting trusts, joint ventures, and
the doctrine of quantum meruit. Id.
11. Cohabitation Statute: Hearings on S.1295 Before the Minnesota Judiciary
Committee (March 18, 1979) (statement of State Sen. Davies, sponsor of the
bill) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 12951.
12. Kersti Yllo, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Beyond the College Campus, 1 Al.
ternative Lifestyles 37, 43 (1978).
13. Cees Strayer, Unmarried Couples: Different From Marriage?, 4 Alternative
Lifestyles 43, 73 (1981).
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of a cohabiting relationship. As a result, the courts cannot dis-
tinguish between different cohabiting relationships. Yet differ-
ences between cohabiting couples demand different legal
treatment. Pursuant to the cohabitation statute, the only factor
courts can consider is whether a written contract exists be-
tween two cohabitants.
The Minnesota statute distinguishes cohabiting relation-
ships solely on the basis of the existence or non-existence of
written contracts. Again, the legislature makes an erroneous
assumption. The legislature assumes cohabitants write con-
tracts. Cohabitants do not, however, generally enter into a
written contract. In one study, only two of seventy-five cohab-
iting couples had made legal arrangements to deal with their
possible separation. Not unexpectedly, it is difficult, if not im-
possible, to find one formally executed contract between cohab-
itants in American case law.
Why don't cohabitants write contracts? Cohabitants are
like other people. Few cohabitants recognize the need to draft
agreements concerning the economic aspects of their personal
relationships with other people. Cohabitants enter their rela-
tionship without thought of the legal or financial consequences
of either marriage or non-marriage. Cohabitants believe that
the law will provide a remedy, or that common law marriages
are still legally recognized. Cohabitants procrastinate and
never make a contract or get married. Cohabitants fear that
consideration of economic matters would debase their relation-
ship. Acknowledging these realities, the question becomes
whether we should assume any cohabitants would write a con-
tract to provide for the division of their accumulated property.
The Minnesota legislature, in making its assumption that
cohabitants write contracts, did not even consider whether co-
habitants actually enter into written cohabitation agreements.
The legislature's primary concern was to encourage marriage
and discourage cohabitation. 14 Restricting cohabitants' access
to the courts addresses this concern-those who do not partici-
pate in the state's institution of marriage have restricted access
to the state's judicial institution. Such a restriction is consis-
tent with the legislature's unstated interest in having people
operate within, rather than outside, the control of the state.
14. Hearings on S. 1295, supra note 11. The cohabitation statute applies ex-
plicitly only to heterosexual couples. See supra note 3. The exclusion of same-
sex couples from the statute either indicates that the legislature is unaware of
same-sex cohabitating couples or further substantiates that the legislature
sanctions only one form of intimate relationship-heterosexual marriage.
[Vol. 2:335
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The Minnesota legislature's conclusion that cohabitants
who agree on a division of their property should enter into a
written contract is not only unrealistic, but also unjust. Since
most cohabitants will not enter into a written contract, the law
does not protect cohabitants, even though they are people
whose relationships often give rise to property expectations.
The legislature unjustly deprives some cohabitants of their le-
gitimate property rights because the cohabitants had neither
the prudence nor the legal or financial means to enter into a
written contract.
Cohabitants are the only group subject to such contractual
restrictions. Other non-cohabiting individuals can rely on the
courts to enforce their property rights through oral contracts or
to apply equitable contract remedies when necessary. The stat-
ute inequitably deprives two individuals of the same contrac-
tual privileges solely on the basis of the individuals' cohabiting
status. Obviously, not all cohabiting relationships will include
enforceable contractual agreements. The state, however,
should neither punish those cohabitants who have reasonable
expectations of property interest based on something other
than a written contract nor ignore the equitable remedies that
vindicate such expectations.
III. The Cohabitation Statute Fails to Address Gender Inequality
The Minnesota cohabitation statute deters changes in the
unequal distribution of power between women and men. Al-
though the cohabitation statute is expressed in gender-neutral
terms, the impact of the statute inequitably favors men. The
power structure in society prompts this result. Most men exer-
cise most power in society. Power is "the ability to act effec-
tively on persons or things, to take or secure favourable
decisions which are not of right allocated to the individuals or
their roles." 15 The power structure manifests itself in the eco-
nomic and political spheres of society. Economic power, the
primary form of power, inheres in those who control the alloca-
tion of scarce goods and services. Political power often results
from economic power. Political power also resides with those
who control or influence group decision-making. Women hold
very little economic or political power.16 Men dominate both
15. Peggy Sanday, Female Power and Male Dominance 114 (1981) (quoting
Michael Smith, Government in Zazzau 18-19 (1960)).
16. Pervasive gender segregation in the labor force, gender-based pay differen-
tials, higher female unemployment rates, and the feminization of poverty
19841
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spheres. Male dominance is the exclusion of women from the
economic and political spheres, and thus from economic and
political power.
Male dominance is a fundamental and universal feature of
social life. The male-power structure perpetuates itself: wo-
men are powerless in the home and in the workplace, so they
have less money, and because women have less money, they
are powerless. Women's position in the male-dominated sys-
tems affects all female-male interactions, including cohabiting
relationships.
Cohabitants, as all other individuals, are not insulated
from the power structure of society. "Intimate relationships do
not take place in a social or cultural vacuum."'17 Although indi-
viduals may view themselves as separate from the controlling
institutions, the very structures they oppose are often repeated
within their "alternative" relationships.s Many cohabitants do
adopt traditional sex roles. The social pressure of the male-
power structure inhibits women and men from changing their
sex role attitudes. Following an established role is often easier
than following a role which society does not support and which
others view as deviant. Socialization and role-scripting serve to
retain conventional behavior in apparent "alternative" relation-
ships, such as cohabitation. In addition, the historical and con-
tinuing economic reality of women serves to limit women to
traditional roles, even those women living in "alternative" rela-
tionships. When the cohabitation statute was enacted, the Min-
nesota legislature did not consider the social situation of
cohabitants, and therefore ignored the gender inequities be-
tween cohabitants.
When analyzing a statute that affects women, legislators
should ask: how does the law affect the imbalance between wo-
men's power and men's power? At best, the imbalance remains
the same under the cohabitation statute. At worst, the imbal-
ance is enhanced, since women's economic investments have
little legal protection when there is not a written cohabitation
contract. The male-power structure remains intact if the courts
demonstrate women's exclusion from the economic sphere. The disproportion-
ate number of men in the federal, state and local legislatures, as well as in the
judiciary, demonstrates the exclusion of women from the political sphere.
17. Laurel Richardson, The Dynamics of Sex and Gender 269 (1981).
18. The radical women involved in the 1960's civil rights and peace movements
considered themselves separate from the controlling institutions. Yet these
radical women were "cast into the traditional roles of serving men coffee, sex,
food, and typed copy." Id. at 254. See also Sara Evans, Personal Politics (1979).
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are unable to use their equitable powers to test the fairness of
cohabitation agreements. Fairness means equal bargaining
power. The societal imbalance of power between women and
men conflicts with the equal bargaining concept underlying
contract law. A system allowing freedom to negotiate and bar-
gain works fairly only if the parties are in reasonably
equivalent positions of power. Otherwise, private contracts re-
inforce power differences that already exist in a relationship.
Women do not have equal negotiating power when entering
into agreements with men. As a result, the likelihood of uncon-
scionable or unfairly written contracts between cohabitants is
great. The traditionally empowered man can use the contract
to restrict property division. The cohabitation agreement thus
maintains and reinforces the unequal status quo.
The inequities perpetuated by the cohabitation statute are
even worse in a cohabiting relationship where there is no writ-
ten agreement. The statute permits male cohabitants to retain
a disproportionate share of the property obtained through the
mutual efforts of the cohabiting parties due to male cohabi-
tants' access to social, political and economic power. Often, co-
habitants register property in the man's name.19 Without a
written agreement, the man retains it. Similarly, more often
than not, the woman rather than the man will leave a lower-
paying job to care for the home and to raise children.20 Even if
the woman is in the labor force, she likely earns less money for
the family unit. But the woman working in the labor force con-
tinues to do most of the unpaid housework and child care. The
division of household labor does not change coincident with
women's increasing labor force participation. Consequently,
the female cohabitant's contributions to the cohabitants' accu-
mulated property will be underestimated, particularly where
there is no written agreement between the cohabiting couple.
Thus, the cohabitation statute unduly benefits the male cohabi-
tant and maintains, if not enhances, the power inequities be-
tween women and men.
Recognition of both cohabitation property rights and wo-
men's status need not conflict. Some feminists argue that co-
19. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ericksen, 337 N.W.2d 671 (Minn. 1983), discussed
infra note 24.
20. Grace Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective,
28 U.C.LA. L. Rev. 1125, 1133 (1981). See, e.g., McCullon v. McCullon, 410
N.Y.S.2d 226 (Erie Co. 1978) (at the beginning of the 28-year-long cohabiting re-
lationship, the woman left her job as a nurse's aide in order to devote full time
to housekeeping for the man).
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habitation property rights beyond an express contract further
undermine women's status.21 These feminists argue that co-
habitation property rights allegedly facilitate the general expec-
tation that women are dependents. Women's economic
dependency, however, is not a mere expectation; it is a reality
for most women. Women's economic dependency prohibits the
full acceptance of women in economic and political spheres.
Women must certainly attempt to break away from their eco-
nomic dependency on male-systems. Nonrecognition of cohabi-
tation property rights, however, will only preserve that
dependence.
Women need more economic and political power to
change their status. Legislators must, therefore, construct
property division laws to remunerate a woman's contribution to
the economic well-being of a family unit. Laws that compen-
sate women for their traditional contributions, such as main-
taining the home, do not enhance their dependency. Such laws
would simply recognize and enforce women's economic rights
to property earned through their labor. One way women will
acquire power is by acquiring property. Recognition of cohabi-
tation property rights would foster women's economic indepen-
dence from male systems.
A typical response to the problems that cohabiting women
face is: "Why don't women get married if they are dissatisfied
with their legal position?" This attitude requires us to work
within the male system to receive all the legal protection possi-
ble. Women should have their property interests legally pro-
tected whether they are married or not. Inequitable laws
should not deprive women of their legitimate economic
interests.
IV. Suggestions for Change
The legal treatment of cohabitation property rights must
accommodate the actual behavior of cohabitants and recognize
the balance of power within female-male cohabiting relation-
ships. The Minnesota cohabitation statute fails to accomplish
either of these objectives. It excludes recovery for a significant
number of cohabitants who have legitimate property interests.
The statute also does not acknowledge or address the unequal
21. See Ruth Deech, The Case Against Legal Recognition of Cohabitation in
Marriage and Cohabitation in Contemporary Societies: Areas of Legal, Social
and Ethical Change 300 (1980).
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distribution of power that exists in most cohabiting
relationships.
Legislators could develop a judicial standard or guideline
that more equitably distinguishes between relationships where
expectations of property interest arise and where no such ex-
pectations exist Legislation could use the degree of interde-
pendency between cohabitants as the distinguishing factor.
The economic pattern of a cohabiting relationship, and there-
fore, the property expectations which arise out of that relation-
ship, is linked with the social structure or interdependencies of
the relationship. The legislature could develop a number of
factors that attempt to measure this interdependency. The fac-
tors could include the age and sex of each cohabitant, the edu-
cational or employment background and opportunities of each
cohabitant, and the length of the cohabiting relationship.
Legal standards developed by legislatures always contain
one major limitation. Legislators cannot properly regulate that
which they do not understand. Cohabitation is a diverse and
complex social relationship. Each cohabiting relationship gives
rise to different expectations and interdependencies. As a re-
sult, the legal treatment of cohabitation property rights should
be left to the judicial branch for the time being. Courts can
consider the circumstances of each unique cohabiting relation-
ship. Courts can examine social and economic factors that cre-
ate the relationship. Courts have the equitable powers to give
effect to the rights and duties that the parties create them-
selves through oral or written agreement, or other relevant
conduct.22
The court's equitable powers should also extend beyond
traditional contract remedies. Relationships are too complex
for courts to view them in traditional contract terms. For exam-
ple, the express contract, implied in fact contract, and resulting
trust theories require that the parties manifest their intent to
distribute property in a certain manner. Cohabitants rarely
manifest their intent with the degree of specificity or in the
manner generally required under traditional contract law. "In-
tent" refers to the objective intent of the parties as though co-
habitants act with one mind. Parties to a personal relationship,
however, unlike a contractual business or investment relation-
ship, rarely have the same mutual intent. The courts should
freely remedy an inequitable or unjust situation without the re-




straints of traditional contract law. The courts have the power
to deal with potential fraud and to curb possible abuse. If the
courts develop cohabitation property rights on a factual case-
by-case basis, eventually a pattern may develop that would al-
low the legislature to standardize cohabitation rights. If a stan-
dard is developed in the courts, cohabitants themselves will
have a chance to define their own rights and obligations. The
resulting standard would, more likely than the ill-founded Min-
nesota statute, reflect the actual lifestyle of cohabitants.
Judicial control over cohabitation property rights in itself
will not change the male-power structure in society. But judi-
cial control is currently the best way to recognize female co-
habitants' contribution to a family unit. The courts, like the
legislatures, are still a part of the male-power structure. Judges
are freer than legislators, however, to change the inequities ex-
isting in the law, because judges' actions are not subject to the
same type of political pressure. Legislators, because of their
political positions in society, have a greater tendency to con-
form to the male-power structure which dominates governmen-
tal and electoral structures. The Minnesota cohabitation
statute illustrates the legislature's tendency to conform. Carl-
son v. Olson2 3 and the recent case In re Estate of Erick en 24
demonstrate the courts' ability to use their equitable powers to
remedy injustice. Until the imbalance of power between wo-
men and men is alleviated, the courts must exercise their equi-
table powers to acknowledge and redress the gender inequities
that society perpetuates.
23. 256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977). See suspra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
24. 337 N.W.2d 671 (Minn. 1983). In Ericksen, the Minnesota Supreme Court
substantially narrowed the potential scope of the cohabitation statute. The
court held that the statute only applies where the sole consideration for a con-
tract between cohabitants is their contemplation of sexual relations out of wed-
lock. 337 N.W.2d at 674. Thus, in Ericksen, the cohabitation statute did not
apply to a female cohabitant's claim to one half of the home that she jointly
purchased and maintained with the deceased male cohabitant, even though the
cohabitants did not have a written agreement regarding the property and the
title to the house was registered in the male cohabitant's name only. The Min-
nesota Supreme Court approved the probate court's creation of a constructive
trust in favor of the female cohabitant consisting of a one half interest in the
home.
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